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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper reports some of the direct costs of raising equity capital by property trust initial 
public offerings (IPOs) in Australia from 1994 to 2004. It also documents the amount of 
underpricing by these IPOs. The results indicate the average fees paid to underwriters 
and/or stockbrokers in managing and marketing the issue was around 3.3% of the public 
equity capital raised.  The average fees paid to legal firms, accounting firms and valuers 
for their professional involvement and expert reports were 0.4%, 0.2% and 0.1% 
respectively, totalling 0.7% of the equity raised. Other fees such as printing, listing fees, 
postage, distribution and advertising cost around 2.1%. The total average direct costs 
amounted to around 6.1% of the proceeds raised. The average underpricing by these 
property trust IPOs was 2.6%. This paper also investigates the hypotheses that the 
percentage direct capital raising costs are influenced by the size of the IPO and whether 
the IPO is underwritten. This study confirms that larger property trust equity capital 
raisings have lower percentage total direct cost;, however, it does not find that 
underwriting significantly influences the percentage of total direct costs for these property 
trust IPOs.  
 
Keywords: IPOs, underpricing, property trusts, issuing costs. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper investigates the direct and indirect costs of raising equity capital by Australian 
listed property trust (LPT) initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1994 to 2004. The major 
components of direct costs include underwriting, stockbroking, legal, accounting, 
valuation, listing, printing, postage, distribution and advertising costs. Indirect costs include 
underpricing costs and the cost of management time working on the IPO. Underpricing is 
generally measured as the difference between the closing price of the IPO’s shares on the 
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first day and its issue price, divided by the issue price. The cost of management time is, 
however, not easily measured and generally not reported to the public.  
 
Two recent studies identify the importance of the property trust sector. Dimovski and 
Brooks (2006) report that LPT IPOs have significant institutional and public equity capital 
investment support in Australia. They identify that 37 such IPOs raised around $7 billion of 
equity capital during 1994 to 1999. This amount is three times the equity capital raised by 
96 resources IPOs and is about one third of the capital raised by 262 industrials for this 
same time period. Newell (2005) identifies how important the LPT sector is by reporting 
the sector has assets of over $100 billion and represents over 8% of the capitalization of the 
total Australian stock market. He also points out that LPTs have had strong compounded 
returns of around 12.28% per annum over a ten year holding period compared to shares 
(around 10.02%) and bonds (around  7.85% per annum) over the same period.  
 
There have been many studies investigating underpricing costs regarding industrial 
company IPOs (see Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) and Dimovski and Brooks (2004 a) for 
Australia and see Ritter (2003) who refers to a range of international studies). There have 
also been many studies investigating the underpricing costs of LPT IPOs or real estate 
investment trust (REIT) IPOs (Dimovski and Brooks (2006) for LPTs in Australia and 
Wang et al (1992) and Ling and Ryngaert (1997) for REITs in the US). In regard to 
industrial companies, Lee, Lochhead, Ritter and Zhao (1996) in the US, Chen and Wu 
(2002) in Hong Kong and Kooli and Suret (2002)) in Canada all report the direct costs of 
raising equity capital for such IPOs in those countries. The purpose of this paper is to assist 
in completing the costs of raising equity capital matrix for Australia by reporting some of 
the direct costs of equity capital raising by Australian LPT IPOs. 
 
In addition, this paper investigates the popular view identified in Pierson et al (2002) 
suggesting that two factors that influence the costs associated with the equity capital raising 
are the size of the IPO and whether the IPO is underwritten. The costs of underwriting can 
be substantial as reported in How and Yeo (2000) who document the average costs of 
underwriting for Australian industrial company IPOs averaged 3.68% over the period 1980 
to 1996. To this author’s knowledge, the literature is not clear on whether underwriting 
itself significantly influences the percentage of total direct costs for Australian property 
trust IPOs. 
 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises some related 
literature. Section 3 outlines the data, sources and methods. In Section 4, the paper reports 
results of the analysis. Section 5 contains the conclusions. 
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RELATED LITERATURE 
 
This section contains two parts. The first part reviews some of the underpricing cost of 
capital raising literature available on industrial company and LPT (and REIT) IPOs. The 
second part reviews some of the direct cost of capital raising literature, including the costs 
of underwriting. It is this second part that appears not to yet include a discussion of the 
direct costs of capital raising by LPT IPOs. It is this part to which the current study hopes 
to contribute. 
 
Underpricing cost literature 
The literature into the underpricing of industrial company IPOs is vast. The range of 
underpricing costs reported internationally ranges from 4.2% in France (Leleaux and 
Murzyka, 1993) to 948.6% in China (Su and Fleisher, 1999). Much of the international 
evidence is summarized in Loughran et al (1994) and Ritter (2003). Australian industrial 
company IPO studies (Finn and Higham (1988), How et al (1995), Lee, Taylor and Walter 
(1996) and Dimovski and Brooks (2004a)) report underpricing costs of between 16.4% and 
29.2%.  It is worth noting that such costs to the firm are of course first day “returns” or 
“profits” to the initial subscribers.   
 
The literature into the underpricing of LPT or REIT IPOs is not vast and the underpricing 
costs nowhere near as large. One of the first reported studies was by Wang, Chan and Gau 
(1992) who investigated 87 US REIT IPOs from 1971 to 1988 and found a 2.82% 
overpricing. Ling and Ryngaert (1997) investigated 85 US REIT IPOs from 1991 to 1994 
and found an average underpricing cost to the firm of 3.60%. 
 
In Europe, Brounen and Eihholtz (2001) examined 83 European property share IPOs during 
1990 to 2000 to report an average underpricing of 3.43%. In a similar vein, Brounen and 
Eicholtz (2002) examined 54 British, French and Swedish property share IPOs during 1984 
to 1999 to report an average underpricing of 2.55%. 
 
In Australia, Dimovski and Brooks (2006) examined 37 property trust IPOs during 1994 to 
1999 to report an average underpricing of 1.2%. As with Ling and Ryngaert (1997), they 
found that underpricing is partly explained by the existence of initial large or institutional 
investors. This paper extends the Dimovski and Brooks (2006) finding of underpricing 
costs for Australian property trust IPOs during 1994 to 1999 of only 1.2%, to document the 
direct costs of capital raising by Australian property trust IPOs and to extend the dataset of 
property trust IPOs to 2004. 
 
Direct cost of raising capital literature 
Lee, Lochhead, Ritter and Zhao (1996) investigated 1767 US IPOs during 1990 to 1994. 
The median IPO capital raising was US$24.4 million. The average underwriting cost was 
7.31%, while the average total direct cost was 11.00% and average underpricing was 
12.05%. This suggests that the average US IPO during this period, with say an issue price 
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of $1, received only 89 cents while their shares were traded at the end of the first day at 
around $1.12. Real estate investment trusts, or property trusts, were not included in the 
dataset. The study identified clear economies of scale in both the total direct costs and 
underpricing costs for IPOs that sought to raise larger sums from the capital market. 
Earlier, Ritter (1987) also pointed out that best efforts underwriting contracts in the US 
were more costly to issuers than firm commitment contracts in both underpricing costs and 
underwriter spreads. 
 
Chen and Wu (2002) investigated 281 Hong Kong IPOs during 1991 to 1996. The total 
amount of equity capital raised was over HK$82 billion. Chen and Wu (2002) report total 
direct costs averaged 10.44% while underpricing costs averaged 15.14%.  This suggests 
that the average Hong Kong IPO during this period, with say an issue price of $1, received 
around 89.5 cents, while their shares were traded at the end of the first day at around $1.15. 
Total direct costs were lower on average at every range of gross proceeds reported from 
US$0 – 9.9 million up to US$500 million and over. This allowed Chen and Wu (2002) to 
claim that Hong Kong had cheaper direct costs of capital raising than in the US. 
 
Kooli and Suret (2002) investigated 224 Canadian IPOs and 1188 US IPOs during 1997 to 
1999. The total amount of equity capital raised in Canada was over US$7.5 billion and over 
US$117 billion in the US. Average underwriting fees in Canada range from 8.12% for IPO 
raisings up to US$10 million and were 5.53% for issues over US$100 million. Average 
underwriting fees in the US range from 9.39% for issues up to US$10 million and were 
6.26% for issues over US$100 million. Kooli and Suret (2002) report the direct costs of 
Canadian firm commitment underwritten IPOs from 1997 to 1999 averaged 14.39% of the 
public equity capital raised, while underpricing costs averaged 18.95%. In terms of the 
combined effect of total direct and underpricing costs, this suggests that the average 
Canadian IPO during this period, with say an issue price of $1, received around 85.5 cents, 
while their shares were traded at the end of the first day at around $1.19. 
 
In addition to the total direct cost of capital raising literature discussed above, it is worth 
reviewing some specific literature that relates to the cost of underwriting for completeness. 
Chen and Ritter (2000) investigate 1,111 US IPOs raising between $20 million and $80 
million and identify that underwriting spreads for those IPOs clustered at exactly 7%. The 
authors argue that this widespread “agreement” in fees by underwriters suggests pricing 
collusion.  
 
Butler and Hwang (2003) investigated 306 IPOs in Hong Kong during 1991 to 2000. They 
found that underwriting spreads in that country also cluster; nearly 94% of the IPOs 
examined had spreads of exactly 2.5%. They argue that the recent arrival of the book-
building process appears to have decreased the clustering. 
 
How and Yeo (2000) examined 282 Australian industrial company IPOs from 1980 to 1996 
and did not find a clustering of fees at any particular percentage. They report an average 
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underwriting fee (exclusive of management and handling fees) of 3.68% and a range of 1% 
to 8% for these Australian IPOs.  
 
It is also worth noting that Dimovski and Brooks (2004b) found that Australian industrial 
company IPOs that engaged underwriters during 1994 to 1999 left more money on the table 
than those IPOs that didn’t employ underwriters. Money left on the table is defined as the 
number of issued shares multiplied by the difference between the issue price and the first 
day of listing closing price. They argued that underwriters may indeed add to indirect 
industrial company IPO costs. 
 
DATA, SOURCES AND METHODS 
 
The primary source of the data was the Connect 4 Prospectuses database. A total of 58 
property trust IPOs were identified from 1994 to 2004. The sample of IPOs is listed in 
Appendix 1. The estimated total direct costs for each issue were identified in every 
prospectus but one. The costs of underwriting and/or stockbroking, legal, accounting and 
valuation work associated with the public issue were often also identified in the prospectus. 
The IPO costs for the 1 of the 58 IPOs did not identify the total costs of the capital raising, 
because they were paid for entirely by the institution floating the entity. Data relating to 
this IPO were removed from the dataset. Connect 4 is a well regarded private company 
provider of Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) information to universities, government 
departments, banks, stockbrokers and other such finance researchers. Its Prospectuses 
database began in 1994. 
 
The closing share price of the first day’s trading was obtained from the IRESS database and 
the Bourse Investor website. Both IRESS and Bourse Investor are highly respected and well 
used share market information systems that derive their pricing data from the ASX. The 
first day’s closing price was deducted from the issue price and then divided by the issue 
price to derive a percentage underpricing cost (or percentage overpricing gain) to the issuer.  
 
The first part of this study provides a descriptive analysis and discussion of the percentage 
direct costs of capital raising and underpricing percentages for LPT IPOs from 1994 to 
2004. The second part of the study investigates some factors that might influence the total  
direct costs of the capital raising. This second part is designed to specifically test the 
Pierson et al (2002) view that two factors that influence the costs associated with the capital 
raising are the size of the raising and whether the issue is underwritten. This study also tests 
whether there may be some more factors that influence the total percentage direct costs. 
More formally, the variables to be tested are as follows: 
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• a LNTOTMIL variable reflects the logarithm of the size of the total capital raising 
(in millions of dollars); it is the natural log of the issue price multiplied by the 
number of shares sought to be issued; 
• the equity holding or guaranteed equity subscription by a large investor/institution 
is denoted by LNINSTIT. This variable is calculated using the formula ln(1+% 
investor/institution holding or subscription). The natural log specification is used 
to reduce the influence of outliers while 1 is added because some LPT IPOs have 
no investor/institutional involvement; 
• the leverage of the trust is denoted as LNDEBTFIN. This is calculated as the 
ln(1+% total liabilities). Again, the natural log is used to reduce the influence of 
outliers and 1 is added because some LPT IPOs do not hold any debt at the time of 
the float; 
• a UWRITTEN dummy variable of 1 is recorded for those property trusts that 
employ an underwriter for the capital raising and 0 for those that don’t; 
• the two most common types of property trust are Office and Retail. They are 
denoted by dummy variables OFFICE and RETAIL respectively; 
• a STAPLED dummy variable is recorded for those property trusts that issued 
stapled securities. Such securities generally consist of a unit in a trust and a share 
in a company. The unit and the share are not tradable without the other. The trust 
is likely to be the holder of income producing real estate, while the company is 
likely to deal in property development activities. 
 
An ordinary least squares regression (OLS) model is performed on the data using the total 
percentage direct costs (TOTALPER) as the dependent variable. The model is expressed 
as:  
 
TOTALPER  =  β0  +  β1LNTOTMIL  +  β2LNINSTIT  +  β3LNDEBTFIN  +     
                          β4UWRITTEN+ β5RETAIL + β6OFFICE  + β7STAPLED  +  ε         (1) 
where all the variables are as defined previously, the β’s are unknown parameters to be 
estimated and ε is assumed ~ N (0, σ²). 
 
The LNTOTMIL reflects the size of the public capital raising. As with Lee, Lochhead,  
Ritter and Zhao (1996), economies of scale are expected and the total percentage direct 
costs are expected to be lower for larger equity capital raisings. The LNINSTIT variable is 
used to determine whether large investor/institutional backing at the outset of the issue 
might add support and credibility to the issue and hence reduce the total percentage direct 
costs. The LNDEBTFIN variable is included to test if leverage influences the total 
percentage direct costs. The latter two variables have been used in Ling and Ryngaert 
(1997) and in Dimovski and Brooks (2006) in testing their influence on underpricing costs. 
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Just as underpricing, according to Beatty and Ritter (1986), reflects the cost of uncertainty 
about an issue (suggesting more uncertain IPOs incur higher underpricing), so too might 
one expect higher direct costs of capital raising with lower institutional support and higher 
leverage at IPO time. 
 
Underwriting fees can be a substantial part of the total percentage direct costs and 
therefore, if an issue is underwritten, one might expect as Peirson et al (2002) that 
underwriting significantly influences the percentage of total direct costs. The UWRITTEN 
variable tests this. The RETAIL, OFFICE and STAPLED variables test if these categories 
of IPO might also influence the percentage of total direct costs. STAPLED IPOs because of 
their property development activities may have more uncertainty about them and hence 
may have higher direct costs of capital raising. While many LPTs presently could be 
characterized as “diversified” because of their involvement in many fields, this 
classification is a more recent phenomenon amongst LPT IPOs. Most prior to 2003 were 
regarded in their prospectuses as office, retail, industrial and leisure LPTs. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 reports the gross proceeds raised by the 57 listed property trust (LPT) IPOs during 
1994 to 2004. A total of $9.665 billion of IPO equity capital (around $8.1 billion from the 
public generally and over $1.5 billion from named institutions or named large investors 
guaranteeing to subscribe) was raised during this period. Of this, $3.43 billion was raised 
(35.5% of the total gross proceeds) by 11 Retail LPT IPOs (19.3% of the total number of 
LPT IPOs), while $3.89 billion was raised (40.2% of the total gross proceeds) by 16 Office 
LPT IPOs (28% of the total number of LPT IPOs). The other 30 LPT IPOs raised a total of 
$2.34 billion. While not included in the table, it is worth noting that 7 of the IPOs were 
stapled, 49 were underwritten and while the average gross equity sought was around $170 
million per IPO, the average expected debt level was around $95 million per IPO. 
 
Table 1 also reports the average direct cost percentages (including legal, accounting, 
valuation and broker and/or underwriter fees and commissions) and underpricing costs (or 
overpricing gains) for the LPT IPOs. Minimum and maximum direct costs and 
underpricing (overpricing) costs are also provided. The average fees and commissions paid 
to underwriters and/or stockbrokers in the administration and marketing of the LPT issue 
cost around 3.56% of the gross public capital raised. The average fees paid to legal firms, 
accountants and valuers for their professional involvement and for their expert reports cost 
around 0.39%, 0.23% and 0.12% (totaling 0.74%) of the gross public proceeds raised. 
Other fees such as printing, listing fees, postage, distribution and advertising cost around 
2.08% of the proceeds raised. These direct costs total around 6.10% of the gross public 
proceeds raised for the LPT IPOs. There are minor differences between capital raising costs 
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for Retail LPT IPOs compared to Office LPT IPOs and Other LPT IPOs but these could be 
related to the size of the issue rather than the type of LPT IPO. This is more formally 
examined later in the paper. 
 
The average percentage underpricing by these LPT IPOs was 2.58%. Average underpricing 
was around 2.51% for the Retail LPT IPOs, while average underpricing for Office LPT 
IPOs was around 2.13% and for the Other LPT IPOs was 3.25%. Underpricing ranged from 
25.33% to overpricing of 20% in our dataset.  
 
The combination of total direct costs and underpricing costs suggests that an average 
Retail, or Office or Other LPT IPO with say an issue price of $1 receives net proceeds of 
around 93 to 95 cents, while their shares are traded at the end of the first day at around 
$1.03.  
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Table 1: Average Direct Costs and Underpricing Percentages: 1994 to 2004 
 
G
ro
ss
 P
ro
ce
ed
s 
($
 m
ill
io
n)
 
N
o.
 o
f I
ss
ue
s 
L
eg
al
 C
os
ts
 %
 
 A
cc
ou
nt
an
t 
C
os
ts
 %
 
V
al
ua
tio
n 
C
os
ts
 
%
 
O
th
er
 C
os
ts
 %
 
B
ro
ke
r/
 
U
nd
er
w
ri
te
r 
C
os
ts
 %
 
T
ot
al
  
D
ir
ec
t C
os
ts
 %
 
U
nd
er
pr
ic
in
g 
%
 
 
Retail LPT 
IPOs 
 
 
 
Office LPT 
IPOs 
 
 
 
Other LPT 
IPOs 
  
3434.1 
 
 
  
3,886.4 
 
 
  
2,344.4 
 
11 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 30 
 
0.33 
 
 
 
0.39 
 
 
 
0.40 
 
0.14 
 
 
 
0.21 
 
 
 
0.27 
 
0.09 
 
 
 
0.10 
 
 
 
0.16 
 
1.14 
 
 
 
2.20 
 
 
 
2.35 
 
3.19 
 
 
 
2.98 
 
 
 
3.48 
 
4.89 
min  2.20 
max 9.13 
 
5.88 
min  2.28 
max 11.25 
 
6.66 
min  2.37 
max 16.71 
 
 2.51 
min  -4.00 
max   7.00 
 
2.13 
min  -10.00 
max   15.79 
 
3.25 
min  -20.00 
max 25.33 
 
 
To $65 million 
LPT IPOs 
 
$65.1 million 
to $150 
million LPT 
IPOs 
 
150.1million 
and over LPT 
IPOs 
 
 
 
618.8 
 
 
     
1,909.2 
 
 
 
 7136.9 
 
20 
 
 
  
 19 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 
0.68 
 
 
 
0.31 
 
 
 
0.20 
 
0.41 
 
 
 
0.18 
  
 
 
0.10 
 
0.18 
 
 
 
0.15 
 
 
 
0.05 
 
3.11 
 
 
 
1.68 
 
 
 
1.28 
 
3.52 
 
 
 
3.70 
 
 
 
2.57 
  
7.90 
min  4.01 
max 16.71 
 
6.02 
min  2.65 
max  11.25 
 
4.20 
min  2.20 
max 10.74 
 
2.80 
min  -5.00 
max  15.00 
 
1.50 
min  -20.00 
max  14.00 
 
4.15 
min  -5.00 
max 25.33 
 
All 57 LPT 
IPOs 
 
 
9664.9 
 
 57 
 
0.39 
 
0.23 
 
0.12 
 
2.08 
 
3.28 
 
6.10 
min    2.20 
max  16.71 
 
2.58 
min  -20.00 
max   25.33 
 
Table 1 also reports the economies of scale in direct costs to be had by larger IPOs. By 
going down each row in the size categories of “To $65 million, $65.1 million to $150 
million and $150.1 million and over LPT IPOs”, the reader can identify how the direct 
legal, accounting, valuation and broker/underwriter costs are generally reduced, the larger 
the capital raising. This reflects the fixed cost nature of most of the direct cost components, 
which are larger in percentage terms when the equity sought is smaller. Interestingly, the 
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larger LPT IPOs during this period also had higher average underpricing costs, but this was 
not a statistically significant difference. The 20 LPT IPOs that raised $65 million or less of 
capital show average total direct costs of 7.90%, nearly 2 percentage points higher than the 
average (6.10%), while the 18 LPT IPOs that raised over $150 million show average total 
direct costs of 4.20%, nearly 2 percentage points lower than the average. 
 
It is interesting to use the combination of direct costs and underpricing costs perspective as 
before on the smaller, to $65 million or less capital raising LPT IPOs and on the larger, 
over $150 million LPT IPOs. The combination of total direct costs and underpricing costs 
suggests that an average smaller LPT IPO with say an issue price of $1 receives net 
proceeds of around 92 cents, while their shares are traded at the end of the first day at 
around $1.03. The combination of total direct costs and underpricing costs suggests that an 
average larger LPT IPO with say an issue price of $1 receives net proceeds of around 96 
cents, while their shares are traded at the end of the first day at around $1.04. The cost data 
of Table 1 was also partitioned in other various ways including by time period (1994 to 
1999 and then 2000 to 2004), by size of institutional subscription and by amount of debt 
financing, but no obvious and major cost differences were found. The significant growth in 
the market capitalization of LPTs in recent times does not appear to have influenced either 
the size of the LPT IPO capital raisings in more recent times, nor the costs.  
 
Table 2 reports the multiple least squares regression results between the total percentage 
direct costs and the selected explanatory variables for the LPT IPOS from 1994 to 2004. A 
range of standard regression diagnostics were calculated and applied. In testing for non-
normal errors, a Jarque-Bera test is reported. Both Reset and White specification tests are 
reported. These indicate heteroscedasticity is a problem. To account for this, White (1980) 
heteroscedasticity adjusted co-efficients and p-values are reported. 
 
Two sets of coefficients and p-values are reported for robustness. The first set includes the 
57 LPT IPOs. The second set excludes one outlier IPO whose percentage total direct cost 
was greater than 3 standard deviations away from the mean. The highly significant negative 
coefficient on LNTOTMIL in both regressions suggests that larger public equity capital 
raisings have economies of scale and are less costly in terms of their percentage of total 
direct costs compared to smaller public equity capital raisings and is consistent with Lee, 
Lochhead, Ritter and Zhao (1996). This suggests that IPO firms that raise more equity 
retain a greater percentage of the capital raised for subsequent use. This may be of great 
benefit to investors in such IPOs. All of the other variables, including the UWRITTEN 
variable are insignificant in the two regressions.  
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Table 2: Regression results for the percentage total direct costs for LPT IPOs in 
Australia: 1994 to 2004 
    56 IPOs 
 All 57 LPT IPOs  1 outlier removed 
 Coef.* Pr.*   Coef.* Pr.*  
C 0.255 0.000   
 
0.241 
 
 
0.000  
LNTOTMIL -0.018 0.000   -0.017 0.000  
LNINSTIT 0.002 0.914   -0.006 0.703  
LNDEBTFIN 0.042 0.179   0.034 0.246  
UWRITTEN 0.002 0.818   0.007 0.428  
RETAIL 0.005 0.539   0.004 0.508  
OFFICE 0.015 0.094   0.014 0.118  
STAPLED -0.010 0.126   -0.011 0.086  
        
        
        
        
R Squared 0.534     0.481   
Adj R Squared 0.467     0.405   
Jarque Bera 1.930 0.381   1.596 0.450  
White Test 18.270 0.051   21.104 0.020  
Reset Test 5.404 0.345    0.474 0.950  
 
* White heteroscedasticity consistent co-efficient and p-values reported.   
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigated 57 listed property trust IPOs during 1994 to 2004 to summarise 
some of the average direct costs of the total equity capital raised. It also identified the 
average underpricing by the LPT IPOs for this 11-year period. These average total direct 
costs provide useful benchmark measures for issuers, underwriters and subscribers to LPT 
IPOs. The paper also extends the Dimovski and Brooks (2006) underpricing dataset of 37 
IPOs during 1994 to 1999 and reports average underpricing in LPT IPOs is 2.6% for the 
expanded set.    
 
In addition, this study examines some of the factors that might influence the percentage 
total direct costs of LPT IPOs. It is clear that larger equity capital raisings have economies 
of scale and are less costly in percentage terms. It is not clear, however, that underwriting is 
a significant factor in influencing the cost of capital raising in percentage terms for LPT 
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IPOs. While underwriting accepts the risk of guaranteeing the success of the capital raising, 
it appears that this cost with regard to LPT IPOs is not significantly higher than the simple 
engagement of brokers to manage and market the issue and the subsequent listing.  
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Appendix 1: The sample of LPT IPOs from 1994 to 2004 and their ASX listing date 
 
COMPANY NAME List Date 
Gandel Retail Trust 07/04/1994 
Prime Credit Property Trust 17/05/1994 
Triplecee Retail Investment Trust 26/08/1994 
Australian Healthcare Inv Fund 16/12/1994 
Colonial Commercial Property Trust 27/11/1995 
Countrywide Retail Trust 15/11/1995 
Goodman Hardie Industrial Property Trust 05/07/1995 
Paladin Commercial Trust 21/12/1995 
AMP Office Trust 10/12/1996 
BT Hotel Group 28/06/1996 
Darling Park Trust 12/12/1996 
Grand Hotel Group 12/08/1996 
Peppers Hotel Trust 04/10/1996 
Suncorp Property Trust 18/12/1996 
Tourism Asset Holdings Ltd 28/06/1996 
Westfield America Trust 03/07/1996 
AMP Shopping Centre Trust 07/11/1997 
Armstrong Jones Industrial Fund 06/11/1997 
Australian Commercial Property Trust 27/08/1997 
Australian Growth Properties Limited 21/05/1997 
Industrial Investment Trust 23/09/1997 
Legal & General Industrial Property Trust 19/12/1997 
Oakford Property Trust 07/08/1997 
Prime Retail Property Trust  22/08/1997 
Prudential Development Trust 22/08/1997 
Sundowner Group 06/11/1997 
Bunnings Warehouse Property Trust 16/09/1998 
Flinders lndustrial Property Trust 13/10/1998 
Homemaker Retail Property Trust 06/04/1998 
Leisurewide Property Trust 02/07/1998 
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MTM Entertainment Trust 12/06/1998 
MTM Office Trust 28/07/1998 
Village Entertainment Property Trust 18/03/1998 
Commercial Investment Trust 18/12/1998 
Commonwealth Property Office Fund 29/04/1999 
Fortland Hotel Property Trust 19/05/1999 
Lend Lease US Office Trust 14/12/1999 
Abacus Property Group 14/11/2002 
Macquarie Prologis 16/06/2003 
Valad Property Grp 13/12/2002 
Record Realty 20/12/2002 
Acumen Capital PSF 8/07/2003 
Westralia PT 10/04/2003 
Westpac Office Trust 7/08/2003 
Rabinov Diversified Property Trust 12/08/2003 
Galileo America Trust 9/12/2004 
ALE Property Group 12/11/2003 
MFS Diversified Trust 14/11/2003 
Macquarie DDR Trust 26/11/2003 
Indigo Pacific Capital 18/05/2004 
Valad OpportuF No 11 2/07/2004 
ING RE Entertainment Fund 8/07/2004 
Village Life 1/07/2004 
Rubicon America 6/12/2004 
Peet & Co 5/08/2004 
Tishman Speyer Office 1/12/2004 
Trinity Consolidated 14/12/2004 
Macarthur Cook 17/12/2004 
 
